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ABSTRACT This article reports on an Internet-based quasi-experiment that took place dur-
ing the French 2012 presidential election. We designed a website where French voters
could vote under different voting rules. Based on the observation of more than 8,000
participants, we find that a substantial minority (10% to 15%) vote differently under the
different systems, with 17% of the voters not voting for their preferred candidate in the
one-round election, this percentage dropped to 12% in the alternative vote (first choice).
Compared to the two-rounds election, at the aggregate level, the top two candidates get
slightly more votes under one round, while the small candidates obtain more first choices
under the alternative vote. These findings are consistent with what the literature suggests
about the impact of these voting systems on voters’ choice.
When people vote in an election they do sounder a given voting system. One obviousquestion that political scientists strugglewith is whether people would make differ-ent choices if the voting systems were dif-
ferent. Most of the time, this question has been addressed
indirectly. Researchers compare voting patterns under different
rules, and they infer that observed differences in the votes result
from differences in the rules (Blais and Carty 1991; Clark and
Golder 2006). It is difficult to tell whether the correlation is spu-
rious or not; causal inferences are always tricky in observational
studies.
We propose a different approach: inviting people to vote under
different systems and comparing their vote choice under these
various systems. This quasi-experiment occurred during the first
round of the French 2012 presidential elections. As done in a pre-
vious study conducted during the 2011 election in Ontario, Can-
ada (Blais et al. forthcoming), we created a website with sections
providing information about four voting systems (one round, two
rounds, alternative, and approval) and another sectionwhere peo-
ple were invited to vote according to each of the four rules and to
complete a short questionnaire (see www.voteaupluriel.org).
Threeweeksbefore theelectionthewebsitewasopentothepub-
lic.Thewebsitewasadvertised throughmanydifferent routes: after
a first phase of direct mailing to the academic world, the general
media got involved and the website was widely advertised in the
mainFrenchnewspapers,ontheInternet, andtheradio.More than
20,000 people visited the website. A total of 11,000 did cast their
vote under each of the four rules and answered the short question-
naire at the end.1 Among those participants, 8,044 had the right to
vote in the election. Our analysis deals with these 8,044 voters.
The participants are not a representative sample of French vot-
ers.Thoseparticipantswhoare interested inpolitics, elections, and
voting rules are probably overrepresented. Besides, we observed a
strongLeft bias.We correct this bias byweighting the participants
so that the reported votes in thefirst roundof the two-rounds elec-
tion corresponds to the actual votes.
Our goal is to determine how many people vote differently
from one system to the other, how many come to support a can-
didate who is not their preferred one, and who are these voters.
“Sincere preference” is tapped in the short questionnaire through
a simple and direct question: “Which presidential candidate do
you prefer?” (See table 1, column 1.)
In 2012, 10 candidates were running for the presidency. The
official results are presented in table 1, column 2. The top two
candidates in the first round were François Hollande, with 29% of
the vote, and Nicolas Sarkozy, with 27%. Hollande was elected in
the second round, with 52% of the vote. A short description of the
candidates follows.
• Nicolas Sarkozy (UMP, Union pour la Majorité Présiden-
tielle), moderate conservative, was the incumbent. Accord-
ing to the preelection polls Sarkozy was very likely to go to
the runoff.
• François Hollande (Parti Socialiste) was themain challenger
and likely winner (after a runoff ) according to the polls.
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• Marine Le Pen (FN, Front National ), extreme Right, was
ranked third, according to the polls, and it would have been
a big surprise if she had made it to the second round. UMP
and FN had proscribed any kind of alliance.
• Jean-Luc Mélenchon (Front de Gauche) led a coalition of
extreme Left parties. According to the polls it was nearly
impossible for Mélenchon to go to the second round. As
expected, Mélenchon invited his supporters to vote for Hol-
lande at the second round although he maintained that he
would not accept a position in a Hollande government.
• François Bayrou (Mouvement pour la Démocratie), a centrist
candidate, tried tomaintain an independent positionbetween
the Left and the Right. According to the polls he had no
serious chance of being one of the top two candidates.
• Eva Joly (Europe Ecologie LesVerts), theGreen candidate, was
allied with the socialist party and had signed an agreement
for the coming legislative elections. She had very little sup-
port in the polls.
• Nicolas Dupont-Aignan, a dissident from the UMP, had no
chance to go to the second round.
• Philippe Poutou and Nathalie Arthaud were two Trotskyist
candidates
• Jacques Cheminade was an autonomous candidate.
Poutou, Arthaud, and Cheminade obtained very few votes.
In table 1, columns 3 and 5 give the candidates’ scores under
the first round (1R) and approval voting respectively.2 As explained
previously, the participants have been weighted so that the votes
in the first round of the two-rounds election correspond to the
actual outcome. Column 4 gives the percentage of first rank
obtained by the various candidates under the Alternative Vote
(AV) (againweighted).Table 2 provides the completeAV counting.
PREFERENCES ANDVOTE CHOICE
First, we look at the relationship between preferences and vote
choice. This review allows us to estimate how many people vote
sincerely for their preferred candidate. In this section we leave
aside approval voting because the concept of “sin-
cere voting” with this rule is unclear and, for AV,
we consider only the first-ranked candidate.
Column 2 of table 1 shows, for each candi-
date, the (weighted) percentage of respondents
who report this candidate as their preferred can-
didate. In terms of first preferences, Sarkozy
comes first, with 25%, followed byHollande with
23%, then Le Pen and Mélenchon with 15%, and
Bayrou with 11%.
For each voting rule, we compute how many
people voted for thepersonwho they indicated in
thequestionnaire as their preferred candidate.3 A
vote is deemed to be sincerewhen it is cast for the
preferred candidate. The proportion of sincere
votes is83%foroneround(1R),87%for tworounds
(2R), and88% for the alternative vote (AV).These
results make sense. Studies of presidential elec-
tions in the United States andMexico and direct
primeministerial elections in Israel suggest that
about 10%of voters donot vote for their preferred
candidate (seeAbramsonetal. 2010).Moredeser-
tion from sincere voting is indicated here which
is not surprising given the high number of candidates, many of
whomarenotviable (Cox1997). In thequestionnaire,wealsoasked
the question: “Do you always vote for the candidate you prefer?”
The answer was “No” for 30% of the respondents.
Note that the amount of insincere votes is 13% for the first
round in the 2R system.This may be surprising because it is often
thought that the first round of a two-rounds election allows peo-
ple to vote sincerely according to their heart, with the understand-
ing that they will have the opportunity to choose among the top
two candidates in the second round.These results alignwith recent
research that suggests that strategic voting exists in both two-
rounds elections and in one-round elections (see Blais 2003).
As expected, the proportion of sincere votes is also high under
the AV (88%). In principle, AV allows people to express their first
preference for an unviable candidate because their second or third
preferences will be considered if necessary (see Tideman 2006).
Still, the proportion of insincere first votes is far from being
Table 1






F. Hollande 23 29 31 25 46
N. Sarkozy 25 27 28 27 36
M. Le Pen 15 18 16 15 23
J.-L. Mélenchon 15 11 10 12 36
F. Bayrou 11 9 9 11 41
E. Joly 6 2 2 6 33
N. Dupont-Aignan 3 2 2 3 15
P. Poutou 1 1 1 1 11
N. Arthaud 0 1 0 1 7
J. Cheminade 0 0 0 0 4
Total 100 100 100 100 254
Note: The approval scores are the percentages of voters who approve the candidates, therefore they do not
sum to 100. 1R = first round, 2R =second round; AV= alternative vote.
Table 2
Vote Count under the Alternative Vote (%)
FH NS MLP JLM FB EJ NDA PP NA JC
Count 1 25 27 15 12 11 6 3 1 1 0
Count 2 25 27 15 12 11 6 3 1 1
Count 3 25 27 15 12 11 6 3 2
Count 4 25 27 15 13 11 6 3
Count 5 25 28 16 14 11 6
Count 6 28 28 17 16 12
Count 7 33 32 17 18
Count 8 36 42 21
Count 9 55 45
Note: FN = François Hollande; NS =Nicolas Sarkozy; MLP=Marine Le Pen; JLM=
Jean-Luc Mélenchon; FB = François Bayrou; EV = Eva Joly; NDA = Nicolas Dupont-
Aignan; PP= Philippe Poutou; NA=Nathalie Arthaud; JC =Jacques Cheminade
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negligible, which suggests that strategic considerations come into
play in alternative vote as well (see Laslier 2012).
The proportion of deserters is the highest among those who
prefer Joly, the Green candidate: almost two-thirds (65%) under
1R and 2R, and 39% under AV. Desertion may occur toward non-
viable candidates: 11.5% of Joly supporters voted for Mélenchon
under 2R and, conversely, Joly received votes from voters who
declared to prefer other candidates. Desertion is substantial among
Mélenchon supporters (37%under 1R, 31%under 2R, and 24%under
AV) and Bayrou supporters (28% under 1R and 2R and 16% with
AV). Desertion is less than 5% for each of the top three candidates
under 2R and for the top two candidates under 1R (6% of Le Pen
supporters desert her under 1R). Some desertion of Sarkozy (4%)
and Le Pen (8%) is seen under AV.
Hence, the phenomenon of insincere voting (as defined ear-
lier: not voting for the preferred candidate) does not reduce to
desertion of nonviable candidates. Nevertheless, as we would
expect, the top three candidates get more votes under 1R, 2R, and
AV thanfirst preferences, especiallywith the first two voting rules,
and all the other candidates obtain fewer votes than first prefer-
ences. This effect is stronger on the Left, because there are several
nonviable left candidates. Indeed, the main beneficiary is the
socialist Hollande, who has 23% of first preferences and 31% of the
vote under 1R, and the main losers are Mélenchon (from 15% of
first preferences to 10% of 1R votes) and Joly (from 6% to 2%).
COMPARINGTHE VOTES
Let us look at the relationship between the three votes. As the ref-
erence,weuse the two-rounds system,which is actuallyused in the
election. Globally, 89% of the voters vote for the same candidate
under1Rand2R.Weseeintable3thatamongHollandeandSarkozy
voters (under 2R), only about 5% would vote differently under 1R.
The percentage of switchers increases to 12% amongLe Pen voters
(most go to Sarkozy) and to 15%, 22%, and 34% respectively among
Bayrou, Mélenchon, and Joly voters (most go to Hollande). The
overall outcome is that the top
two candidates get more votes
with 1R (Hollande goes from
29% with 2R to 31% with 1R and
Sarkozy from 27% to 28%) and
that the third and fourth candi-
dates lose(from18%to16%inthe
case of Le Pen and from 11% to
10% forMélenchon).
Table 4 indicates the link
between vote choice in the AV
and 2R elections. Globally, 86%
vote for the same candidate in
the two elections and 14%
switch. Hollande voters in the
2R election are the most likely
(20%) to switch in the AV elec-
tion,mostly forMélenchon and
Joly. Interestingly, Le Pen also
loses 19% of those who vote for
her under 2R,mostly to the ben-
efit of Sarkozy.4 Sarkozy is the
candidate who keeps the great-
est proportion (93%) of his vot-
ers. All in all, Hollande’s share
of first votes under AV is four points lower than under 2R (25%
versus 29%); Le Pen also loses three points (15% versus 18%) and
the minor candidates do better, most especially Joly. Sarkozy
remainswith the same score (27%), which allows him to havemore
first choices than Hollande.
THE STRUCTURE OF INDIVIDUAL AV BALLOTS
Under AV, voters can rank order all the candidates from first to
last.The participantswere asked to indicate at least their top three
choices. Table 2 shows the vote count under AV, leading, just like
2R, to the election of Francois Hollande against Nicolas Sarkozy.
Wefirst consider the relationshipbetween thefirst and the sec-
ond rank. Table 5 shows the relationship.We can see that 40% of
second choices among those whose first choice is Hollande go to
Mélenchon, 28% to Bayrou and 26% to Joly. In the case of Sarkozy,
53% of second choices are for Bayrou and 16% for Le Pen and Hol-
lande.Note thatmanymore Sarkozy supporters arewilling to cast
their second vote forHollande than the reverse.Themost popular
second choice amongLePen’s supporters is, tellingly, not Sarkozy
(whogetsonly31%)butratherDupont-Aignan(38%),whogetsonly
3%offirst votes.Mélenchonsupporters, as expected, give their sec-
ond vote to either Hollande (41%) or Joly (32%). Those whose first
choice is Bayrou give their second vote to the top two candidates,
39% toHollande and 30% to Sarkozy. And finally Joly’s supporters
split their second votes betweenHollande andMélenchon.
We determine which combinations of first, second, and third
choices are the most frequent. Table 6 lists the 10 most frequent
combinations. These 10 most frequent combinations together
account for only 35% of all cases, a testimony of the great variety
of preference orders among the participants.
The most popular combination (6%) is Sarkozy-Bayrou-
Hollande, indicating support for the status quo first, for the cen-
ter second, and themoderate Left third.The secondmost frequent
is Hollande-Mélenchon-Joly, representing the moderate Left, fol-
lowed by the extreme Left and the Greens.
Table 3
Votes in the One Round Election (%) byVote in the First Round
of the Two Rounds Election
TWO ROUND
One Round FH NS MLP JLM FB EJ NDA PP NA JC Total
F. Hollande 94 0 2 19 9 29 4 18 7 5 31
N. Sarkozy 0 96 5 0 5 1 8 2 4 14 28
M. Le Pen 0 1 88 0 0 0 1 0 0 5 16
J.-L. Mélenchon 3 1 1 78 0 3 2 3 0 10 10
F. Bayrou 1 2 2 1 85 1 4 1 0 19 9
E. Joly 2 0 0 1 1 66 0 0 0 0 2
N. Dupont-Aignan 0 0 3 0 0 0 80 0 0 0 2
P. Poutou 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 75 7 5 1
N. Arthaud 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 81 0 1
J. Cheminade 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 43 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: FN = François Hollande; NS =Nicolas Sarkozy; MLP=Marine Le Pen; JLM=Jean-Luc Mélenchon; FB = François Bayrou; EV=
Eva Joly; NDA=Nicolas Dupont-Aignan; PP= Philippe Poutou; NA=Nathalie Arthaud; JC =Jacques Cheminade
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What is perhaps more striking in this list is that Sarkozy is
either first or nonpresent, an indication that he was a polarizing
candidate.The same is true for Le Penwho, despite being third on
the first ballot, appears only in one of the combinations. At the
opposite end, we find the centrist candidate Bayrou, who receives
only 9% of the votes under 2R but is present in seven of the 10
most popular combinations.
Although Bayrou is often ranked quite high in the partici-
pants’ AV ballots, when we look at the details of the vote trans-
fers along the alternative-vote elimination path we observe that
Bayrou is quickly eliminated (5th elimination) because, even
if he is highly ranked, he is often behind one of the top two
candidates. This pattern is the
phenomenon of “squeezing of
the center” often described for
two-round voting and that




From what we have seen so far,
it seems that, for this election,
voters’ behavior under the three
rules (1R, 2R, AV) is not so dif-
ferent. Moreover, the outcome
is always the same, that is, Hol-
lande is elected.Thus this ques-
tion: would the result of the
election have been the same
under any voting rule?
In the vote section of the sur-
vey, we asked voters how they
would vote at the second round
of the election in the 10 hypo-
thetical cases where the five
main candidates (Hollande,
Sarkozy, Le Pen, Mélenchon,
and Bayrou) are present in the
runoff.5 It turns out that Bay-
rou wins against any opponent
(with 53% of the votes against
Hollande, 66% against Sarkozy,
65% against Mélenchon, and
79% against Le Pen).
If we trust this observation
we might conclude that Bayrou
would be elected under voting
rules that elect the Condorcet
candidatewhen there is one.We
did not propose such voting
rules, but we invited people to
vote according to approval vot-
ing. Under this rule people can
vote for as many candidates as
they want. The approval scores
are as follows: Hollande 46%
and Bayrou 41%, ahead of
Sarkozy 36% (see the last col-
umn of table 1). Comparedwith
the previous rules, these results strengthen the centrist candidate
(Bayrou).
CONCLUSION
We offered French voters the opportunity to vote under different
voting rules. Most people vote for the same candidate that they
support under the first vote of a two-rounds election, under a one-
round system, or under alternative voting (first choice). But a sub-
stantial minority (respectively 11% and 14%) vote differently. The
top two candidates get slightly more votes in a one-round elec-
tion while the less-popular candidates obtain slightly more first
choices under AV, compared to the two rounds election. We also
Table 4
First Votes in the Alternative Vote Election (%) byVote in the First
Round of the Two Rounds Election
TWO ROUND
AV FH NS MLP JLM FB EJ NDA PP NA JC Total
F. Hollande 80 0 1 6 5 8 1 5 11 0 25
N. Sarkozy 0 93 7 0 2 1 3 2 4 10 27
M. Le Pen 0 1 81 0 0 0 3 0 0 0 15
J.-L. Mélenchon 7 0 1 86 1 1 2 3 4 10 12
F. Bayrou 3 3 3 1 90 1 5 1 4 14 11
E. Joly 8 1 0 5 2 89 1 5 0 0 6
N. Dupont-Aignan 0 1 5 0 0 0 84 0 0 0 3
P. Poutou 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82 0 10 1
N. Arthaud 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 1 78 0 1
J. Cheminade 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 57 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: FN = François Hollande; NS =Nicolas Sarkozy; MLP=Marine Le Pen; JLM=Jean-Luc Mélenchon; FB = François Bayrou; EV=
Eva Joly; NDA=Nicolas Dupont-Aignan; PP= Philippe Poutou; NA=Nathalie Arthaud; JC =Jacques Cheminade
Table 5
Second-ranked Candidates (%) by First-ranked Candidate in the
Alternative Vote Election
1ST-RANKED CANDIDATE
2nd-ranked Candidate FH NS MLP JLM FB EJ NDA PP NA JC Total
F. Hollande 0 16 1 41 39 43 3 8 2 8 25
N. Sarkozy 4 0 31 1 30 2 20 4 0 4 27
M. Le Pen 0 16 0 2 3 1 40 0 0 42 15
J.-L. Mélenchon 40 5 7 0 6 37 10 45 25 22 12
F. Bayrou 28 53 15 6 0 10 15 1 2 4 11
E. Joly 26 1 3 32 13 0 5 14 6 0 6
N. Dupont-Aignan 0 9 38 2 6 1 0 2 0 13 3
P. Poutou 1 0 1 13 1 5 1 0 61 7 1
N. Arthaud 0 0 1 3 0 3 1 25 0 0 1
J. Cheminade 0 0 3 1 1 1 6 2 4 0 0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note: FN = François Hollande; NS =Nicolas Sarkozy; MLP=Marine Le Pen; JLM=Jean-Luc Mélenchon; FB = François Bayrou; EV=
Eva Joly; NDA=Nicolas Dupont-Aignan; PP= Philippe Poutou; NA=Nathalie Arthaud; JC =Jacques Cheminade
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find that, respectively, 12%, 13%, and 17% of the voters do not vote
for their preferred candidate under AV, at the first round of the
two-round election, and under one-round voting. All these results
are consistent with what the literature suggests about the impact
of these voting systems on voters’ choice.
Finally, an inherent limit of this kind of quasi-experiment is
that the political offer (the set of candidates) might be different
under different voting rules. This study only deals with the vot-
ers’ behavior, which is only one aspect of the impact of voting
systems.
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NOTES
1. Voting under the four rules and filling the questionnaire took about 20
minutes.
2. As explained on the web site, under approval voting, “Each voter indicates, for
each candidate, if he or she approves the candidate. The candidate who is ap-
proved by the largest number of voters is elected.”
3. For the sake of brevity we do not report the full tables of votes and preference
transfers among all candidates.
4. This phenomenon may be due to “inverse strategic voting” (Blais 2003). Right-
wing voters who prefer Sarkozy to LePen as a president nevertheless vote for
Le Pen in the first round to “pull” Sarkozy toward the more right-wing
positions.
5. Recall that the data was collected before the first round of the election.
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Table 6










Sarkozy Bayrou Hollande 6
Hollande Mélenchon Joly 5
Hollande Joly Mélenchon 4
Sarkozy Bayrou Dupont-Aignan 4
Hollande Mélenchon Bayrou 3
Sarkozy Le Pen Bayrou 3
Hollande Bayrou Joly 3
Hollande Bayrou Mélenchon 3
Mélenchon Hollande Joly 3
Sarkozy Hollande Bayrou 2
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